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Abstract 
 
New Zealand’s approach to retirement incomes profoundly changed with the recent 
introduction of KiwiSaver and its associated tax incentives. Previous policy reduced lifetime 
inequality but KiwiSaver and its tax incentives will increase future inequality and lead to 
diverging living standards for the elderly. In this paper we evaluate the distributional effects 
of these tax incentives. Using data from a nationwide survey conducted by the authors, we 
estimate the value of the equivalent income transfer provided to individuals by the tax 
incentives for KiwiSaver participation. Concentration curves and inequality decompositions 
are used to compare the distributive impact of these tax incentives with those for New 
Zealand Superannuation. Estimates are reported for both initial and lifetime impacts, with the 
greatest effect on inequality apparent in the lifetime impacts. 
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I. Introduction 
 
New Zealand’s distinctive approach to retirement saving profoundly changed on 1 July 2007, 
with the introduction of KiwiSaver and associated tax incentives. The previous approach, in 
place since 1990, provided a non-contributory flat pension to anyone who qualified by virtue 
of age and residency and then let people supplement that as they saw fit without favouring 
one particular savings vehicle over another (St John and Willmore, 2001). In contrast, many 
countries also promote a contributory (and often mandatory) savings scheme to supplement 
the basic pension and voluntary provision. Since the flat pension, NZ Superannuation (NZS), 
is paid to everyone at a standard amount unrelated to previous earnings, it helps to equalize 
lifetime incomes.1 Scobie, Gibson and Le (2005) show that NZS places a floor under the 
income of retirees, so that even when some fall below a relative poverty line (60% of the 
median) the poverty gap is negligible. Additionally, Ginn, Street, and Arber (2001) describe 
it as a ‘women-friendly’ pension because there are no earnings-related contributions, so 
women receive the same payments as men even though their average incomes are lower and 
they participate in the labour force for fewer years. 
 
 These same features are not present in KiwiSaver, which will instead increase future 
inequality in lifetime incomes and lead to diverging living standards for the elderly. Since 
KiwiSaver is mainly a workplace saving scheme, it will tend to amplify gender, ethnic, 
educational and other inequalities reflected in earnings and employment variations. Not only 
will wealth (and retirement income) gaps emerge between members and non-members, the 
differing levels of member and employer contributions and variation in the performance of 
KiwiSaver funds will also introduce inequality. While such inequalities might be considered 
an inherent feature of any saving scheme, they are likely to be compounded by the generous 
taxpayer incentives provided to KiwiSaver members (Crossan, 2007). It is unclear whether 
there is a public mandate for policy to contribute to inequality in this manner. 
 
 The main incentives for KiwiSaver participation are the $1000 tax-free contribution on 
first joining (the ‘kickstart’), the matching contribution of up to $20 per week ($1043 per 
year) from the government for members aged over 18,2 and the exemption from Specified 
Superannuation Contribution Withholding Tax (SSCWT) for employer contributions up to a 
maximum of four percent of the employee’s gross pay. In addition, there is a subsidy for the 
purchase of a first home of up to $5,000 (subject to income and house price limits), a fee 
subsidy of $40 per year, and from 1 April 2008 employers will receive a tax credit of up to 
                                                
1  O’Connell (2004) considers NZ Superannuation to be an example of a ‘Citizen’s Pension’ – a basic 
amount payable to all citizens. 
 
2  While this is called a tax credit it has little to do with the tax system except as the source of the 
revenue for this grant. Thus, individuals who pay no tax, such as those out of the workforce, can 
still receive up to $1043 per year from the government into their KiwiSaver account if their own 
contributions match or exceed this level. 
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$20 per week to (partially) offset the cost of compulsory employer contributions into the 
accounts of employed KiwiSaver members. These employer contributions are set to rise from 
one percent of gross pay in 2008 to four percent by 2011. Existing superannuation schemes 
that become KiwiSaver-compliant can access many of these benefits, including the 
exemption from SSCWT for employer contributions and the matching government 
contribution of up to $1043 per year. The investment income earned within KiwiSaver 
schemes is also favoured by comparison with equivalent earned income.  The highest paid 
members will have tax on fund earnings capped at 30 percent from 1 April 2008 which is 
lower than either of the two higher marginal rates of tax on earned income (33 percent for 
pay between $38,000 and $60,000 and 39 percent for pay above $60,000). 
 
 These tax incentives will have varying impacts on inequality. The effect of the kickstart 
incentive for joining KiwiSaver and the $1043 matching contribution will depend on how 
widespread is KiwiSaver membership. If it is mainly the rich who join, then despite the equal 
and capped nature of these payments, they may still cause inequality to rise. There is even 
greater likelihood that the exemption from SSCWT for employer contributions will increase 
inequality; since this is capped as a percentage of salary rather than a dollar amount, higher 
earners benefit more from this incentive than do lower earners (while non-earners and the 
self-employed do not benefit at all). Moreover, the SSCWT exemption will over time become 
a more important source of inequality, since it provides open-ended benefits every year until 
retirement, while the kickstart benefit is a one-off and the matching government contribution 
is capped. Finally, the growing KiwiSaver balances for the more highly paid will be favoured 
by the concessionary tax treatment of investment income. Hence, any tendency for KiwiSaver 
incentives to contribute to inequality can be expected to increase over time, especially once 
employer contributions to KiwiSaver become compulsory and increase each year from one 
percent of pay in 2008 to four percent in 2011.3 
 
 These likely effects on inequality should not be surprising. New Zealand experimented 
with tax-favoured saving schemes over two decades ago. These were found wanting since 
they encouraged shifts from non-tax favoured saving into tax-favoured saving with little 
evidence that saving actually improved overall but with large hidden cost to the Government 
in tax forgone that reduced public saving (St John, 2006). Moreover, Treasury at the time 
found that tax incentives largely favoured the better off, who can use tax-favoured schemes to 
                                                
3  The effect of the tax credit to employers is harder to evaluate, since its incidence, and the incidence 
of the implicit payroll tax in the form of compulsory employer contributions to KiwiSaver accounts, 
depends on the supply and demand elasticities in the labour market. However, a substantial fraction 
of the respondents to the survey discussed below believe that employers will give smaller wage 
increases in future, since they also will need to provide KiwiSaver contributions. If this occurs, non-
members will effectively subsidise members by receiving lower wage rises, causing a further rise in 
inequality. 
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avoid higher tax rates and who save the most anyway. Consequently, this previous 
experiment with tax breaks for saving schemes was ended in 1987.  
 
 While a comprehensive evaluation of KiwiSaver is planned, it may be several years 
before standard data sources show impacts on inequality. The Survey of Family, Income and 
Employment (SoFIE) would be a natural source for such analysis since it collects information 
on financial assets like retirement savings schemes every second year and also allows a wide 
variety of distributional analyses based on demographic and economic characteristics. 
However, wave 6 of SoFIE went into the field in October 2007 without any questions on 
KiwiSaver so it will not be until wave 8 in 2009/10 when necessary data are collected. The 
processing lags in accessing SoFIE data make it likely that independent analyses will have to 
wait until 2012. By that stage, cumulative government expenditure on KiwiSaver incentives 
will likely have exceeded $6 billion and a large proportion of the population may be locked 
into this saving scheme.4 Consequently it would be difficult to then make changes even if an 
evaluation indicated a failure of the scheme to achieve its objectives and a high risk of it 
causing diverging living standards for future retirees. 
 
 Therefore to provide more immediate data to help inform on-going appraisals of 
KiwiSaver and its associated tax incentives, we initiated a nationwide KiwiSaver survey in 
December 2007. Almost 400,000 people had joined KiwiSaver by this stage, requiring 
government expenditure of over $800 million in the first year alone, making an evaluation 
even at this early stage desirable. A major objective of the survey was to provide information 
that could be used to estimate the value of the equivalent income transfer provided to 
individuals by the tax incentives for KiwiSaver participation. In this paper we report on the 
results of this survey, using tools such as concentration curves and inequality decompositions 
to compare the distributive impact of these tax incentives with those for New Zealand 
Superannuation.  
 
 This comparison is not meant to imply that KiwiSaver is necessarily an alternative to 
NZS, since it was designed to work on top of NZS rather than instead of it. There are, 
however, considerable fiscal risks with KiwiSaver and it is possible that future governments 
respond to these by adjusting NZS rather than KiwiSaver. For example, in just two years 
between Budget 2005 and Budget 2007 the forecast midterm (2016/17) cost of KiwiSaver 
incentives increased by a factor of 32 (Crossan, 2007), which indicates the ease with which 
                                                
4  According to a Memorandum to Cabinet ‘Budget 2007: KiwiSaver Plus’ (CAB (07) 136, 19 April, 
2007) which is available from www.treasury.govt.nz the projected costs under the mid-estimate of a 
take up rate of 50% of the eligible population joining KiwiSaver after ten years rise from $299 
million in 2007/08 to $1332 million in 2011/12 and have a cumulative nominal value of $4.5 
billion. However, since take up rates appear to be much higher (Crossan, 2007) either the high take-
up rate of 65% after 10 years or the fast take up rate of 50% after five years appear more realistic. 
Both of these scenarios imply cumulative costs of over $6 billion by 2012. 
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governments can increase the generosity of tax incentives. It may be more politically difficult 
to roll these back in future, since a set of entitlements based on individual accounts has been 
created, than it is to adjust NZS, which is based on more of an implicit social contract 
between working-age and retired generations. Moreover, since NZS has been the dominant 
feature of retirement incomes policy for several decades, it provides an appropriate 
benchmark for evaluating the inequality effects of an innovation like KiwiSaver. 
 
II.  The KiwiSaver Survey  
 
The data used in this paper are from a nationwide postal survey carried out by the authors in 
December 2007 and January 2008. A simple random sample was drawn from the New 
Zealand electoral rolls, at a sampling rate of 1:2000 for all general electorates. A higher 
sampling rate, of 1:1000, was used for the Maori electorates since a sufficient number of 
respondents were needed to enable estimates of KiwiSaver incidence across different ethnic 
groups. A total of 1662 survey forms were sent out, with 604 completed responses. The 
response rate was 38 percent, after adjusting for almost 100 cases where forms were not 
delivered due to changed addresses. A set of sampling weights were derived to account for 
both non-response and the higher sampling rate from Maori electorates and all results 
presented below are weighted to ensure that they are nationally representative of the 
population age 18 years and above.5 These sampling weights range from 1370 to 13,800, with 
an average value of 4,810. 
 
 The survey included questions on knowledge and use of KiwiSaver, the level of 
contributions that individuals and their employer made to KiwiSaver accounts and the 
method of joining (auto enrolment, direct enrolment, and having an existing saving scheme 
become KiwiSaver compliant). These details facilitate calculation of the incentives that 
individuals are eligible for, which vary between KiwiSaver and KiwiSaver compliant 
schemes. Demographic and economic details on the respondents were based on questions 
copied from the Census, with additional questions to capture information on earnings, since 
KiwiSaver contributions are mostly based on the level of gross earnings.6  
                                                
5  Specifically, we grouped responses into 36 cells, based on gender, two ethnicity categories 
(combining Maori and Pacific Islanders into one group and all other ethnicities into the other), three 
age groups (18-34, 35-54 and 55 and above) and three income ranges ($25,000 and below, $25,001 
to $50,000 and $50,001 and above). The same grouping was applied to population totals derived 
from the New Zealand Income Survey, and the ratio of population in each cell to the number of 
KiwiSaver survey responses in the corresponding cell was used as the sampling weight. Ideally this 
procedure would have been carried out with the 2006 Census instead of the Income Survey, but the 
Census introduced the ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity category which is not comparable with the ethnic 
groups specified in the KiwiSaver survey. We are grateful to Steven Stillman for assistance with 
this weighting exercise. 
 
 
6  The survey used the 14 income brackets from the 2006 Census, but the actual median income in 
each bracket rather than the middle of the range is then used in the calculations. This median is 
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 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics from the survey for several characteristics of interest, 
for six sub-groups. The first group is the full sample of those without either KiwiSaver or a 
KiwiSaver-compliant savings scheme, which also includes people, aged 65 and above, who 
are not eligible for KiwiSaver. The second group is the non-members just in the 18-64 age 
range. The next three groups are for those who (i) were auto enrolled in KiwiSaver, (ii) those 
who enrolled directly via their employer or with a KiwiSaver fund, and (iii) those whose 
existing saving scheme became KiwiSaver compliant. The last column of the table is for the 
aggregate of all three of these KiwiSaver or KiwiSaver-compliant membership groups. 
 
All Ages 18-64
Age 18-34 0.31 0.39 0.67 0.16 0.29 0.30
[0.03] [0.03] [0.12] [0.06] [0.16] [0.06]
Age 35-54 0.38 0.47 0.31 0.51 0.71 0.50
[0.02] [0.03] [0.12] [0.07] [0.16] [0.06]
Age 55-64 0.31 0.14 0.02 0.33 0.00 0.20
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.06] [0.00] [0.04]
Male 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.52 0.49 0.52
[0.02] [0.03] [0.15] [0.07] [0.16] [0.06]
Maori and Pacific Island 0.14 0.16 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.14
[0.02] [0.02] [0.09] [0.05] [0.15] [0.04]
5th Form qualifications or below 0.35 0.29 0.31 0.22 0.07 0.21
[0.02] [0.03] [0.14] [0.05] [0.07] [0.05]
6th or 7th Form, trade cert or diploma 0.45 0.49 0.45 0.46 0.56 0.48
[0.02] [0.03] [0.15] [0.07] [0.15] [0.06]
Bachelors degree or higher quals 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.33 0.37 0.32
[0.02] [0.02] [0.10] [0.06] [0.14] [0.05]
Home owner 0.69 0.63 0.30 0.77 0.76 0.66
[0.02] [0.03] [0.11] [0.07] [0.15] [0.06]
Owner of other property 0.20 0.19 0.04 0.34 0.07 0.24
[0.02] [0.02] [0.04] [0.06] [0.07] [0.05]
Income (annual, pre-tax) 33668 35930 32571 46375 56754 44626
[1192] [1426] [4367] [3649] [11951] [3091]
Sample size 505 384 16 71 12 99
Population 2463153 1968222 103948 280729 58570 443247
[69722] [79572] [30266] [35733] [18264] [48527]
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Various Sub-groups in the Survey
All 
KiwiSaver
Note:  Standard errors of means in brackets
   Non Members Auto 
enrolled
Direct 
enrolled
KiwiSaver 
compliant
 
 
 The survey estimates of KiwiSaver membership compare well with official data. Reports 
from the government indicate that there were a total of 381,000 KiwiSaver members by the 
end of December 2007 and 414,000 by late January 2008, not counting those in KiwiSaver 
compliant schemes. Approximately eight percent of these were under age 18 and so will not 
                                                                                                                                                  
calculated from the 2006 New Zealand Income Survey, which obtains actual income levels rather 
than income ranges. We are grateful to Steven Stillman for providing these medians.  
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show up in a sample based on the electoral rolls.7 Therefore the relevant age group population 
is between 352,000 and 382,000 while our survey estimate of this population is 384,700.8  
 
 The breakdown between types of KiwiSaver members appears to be rapidly evolving, 
making it difficult to see how the survey compares with official data. The survey estimate of 
280,700 direct enrollees is almost three times as large as the estimated number of auto 
enrollees, at 103,900. This same breakdown is not publicized when administrative data on 
total membership are released, but information supplied by the Inland Revenue Department 
indicates that by the end of December 2007 there had been 183,400 auto enrollees, of whom 
58,000 had opted out, and 255,700 direct enrollees, giving a ratio of direct to auto enrolled 
members of just over 2:1. The same ratio in October had been 3:1.9 It is plausible that this 
ratio will decline over time, since auto enrolments will continue to grow as people change 
jobs while direct enrolments will slow down since the people with the most incentive to join 
directly will have already have done so in order to capture as many of the tax incentives as 
early as possible.  
 
 The survey suggests that KiwiSaver members are older than non-members, are less likely 
to be Maori or Pacific Islanders but more likely to be male, to hold a degree or higher 
qualification, and to have higher incomes. Large differences are apparent between direct 
enrollees and auto enrollees, with 67 percent of auto enrollees below age 35 but only 
16 percent of direct enrollees in this age range. This likely reflects the higher job turnover 
among the young raising their auto enrolment rate. For direct enrolments, older people have 
an advantage since they can obtain the tax incentives with lower opportunity cost, since they 
do not have to lock up their own contributions for very many years before cashing in their 
KiwiSaver accounts at age 65. Substantial income differences are also apparent. While auto 
enrollees have annual incomes that are $3,000 below similarly aged non-members, direct 
enrollees have annual incomes that are $10,000 higher and members of KiwiSaver compliant 
schemes have annual incomes that are over $20,000 higher. These income differences 
between KiwiSaver members and non-members suggest that the KiwiSaver incentives will 
tend to raise inequality, even for the $1,000 kickstart and $1,043 annual government 
contribution payments, which are capped.  
 
 
                                                
7  Based on a report in the Beehive Bulletin of 12/10/07 that 8.6 percent of members are under age 20. 
 
8 Approximately two-thirds of our survey responses were received in December and one-third in 
January, so a weighted average of the administrative reports gives a population of 361,700, which is 
within 6% of our survey estimate. 
 
9  An Official Information Act request by the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, with 
information provided on 4/12/07 for October 2007, shows that by that month there were 62,920 auto 
enrolled (a further 32,752 had opted out), and 188,816 direct enrolled. 
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III. The Incidence of KiwiSaver Incentives 
 
One way to consider the incidence of the KiwiSaver incentives is to see what share of the 
total accrues to various population sub-groups. A disaggregation into groups defined by age, 
gender, ethnicity, education, and income is reported in Table 2. Since only those aged less 
than 65 are eligible for KiwiSaver the comparisons are restricted to that group.  
 
(b)/(a) (c)/(a)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Age
Age 18-34 0.374 0.284 0.462 0.759 1.234
Age 35-54 0.476 0.496 0.467 1.044 0.982
Age 55-64 0.150 0.219 0.071 1.461 0.473
Gender
Female 0.511 0.432 0.407 0.846 0.798
Male 0.489 0.568 0.593 1.160 1.211
Ethnicity
Maori and Pacific Island 0.159 0.113 0.101 0.707 0.635
Other ethnic groups 0.841 0.887 0.899 1.056 1.069
Education
Fifth form qualifications or below 0.279 0.196 0.163 0.703 0.587
6th or 7th Form, trade cert or diploma 0.484 0.465 0.455 0.960 0.940
Bachelors degree or higher quals 0.238 0.340 0.381 1.430 1.606
Income Group
Up to $30,000 0.456 0.227 0.143 0.499 0.314
$30,001-$70,000 0.439 0.600 0.666 1.365 1.515
$70,001 and above 0.105 0.173 0.191 1.654 1.825
Table 2: Shares of Population and KiwiSaver Incentives Accruing to Various Sub-Groups
Note:  Estimates are weighted to reflect population totals for the resident New Zealand population age 18-64.
Lifetime value of KiwiSaver incentives are calculated using the procedure described in footnote 10.
Share of 
population
Share of First 
Year Incentive
Share of Life-
time Incentive
Relative shares
 
 
 Separate calculations are made of the incidence of the tax incentives in the first year and 
their lifetime incidence.10 This lifetime incidence is the present value of the tax incentives 
received between 2007 and the year when members who had joined by December 2007 reach 
age 65.11 
                                                
10  These calculations are just for members who had joined by the time of the survey. Other 
calculations based on projected membership once 50% of the age-eligible population have joined 
are reported below. 
 
11  Specifically we combine our survey data with 2006 Census average earnings and employment 
rates for age, gender and qualification cohorts and with life table data on survival rates for the 
same cohorts. The expected value of earnings at any future age, a is then the product of the 
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 The sub-groups who receive a larger share of first year KiwiSaver incentives than their 
population share would warrant are those above age 55, males, and especially those with 
Bachelors degrees or higher qualifications and high income earners (Table 2, columns (a), (b) 
and (d)). For example, in the first year of the KiwiSaver scheme, 34 percent of the value of 
the incentives is being captured by degree holders and above, despite this group being only 
24 percent of the population. Similarly, 17 percent of the tax incentives go to those with 
incomes above $70,000 despite this group being just 11 percent of the population. Those with 
only Fifth Form qualifications or less, females, Maori and Pacific Islanders, and especially 
those with annual incomes below $30,000 receive only small shares of the value of 
KiwiSaver incentives in the first year relative to their population size.  
 
 The inequality across population sub-groups in the distribution of KiwiSaver incentives is 
even more apparent in the lifetime estimates. The highest income group receives over 
80 percent more of the lifetime incentives than their population would dictate while the 
lowest income group receives less than one-third of their proportionate share (Table 2, 
column (e)). Similarly, Maori and Pacific Islanders, women and the least educationally 
qualified group receive an even smaller share of the lifetime value of KiwiSaver incentives 
than either their share in the first year or the share that their population size would predict. 
Age is the only characteristic where the incidence patterns vary between the first year and the 
lifetime, since the lifetime calculations give younger KiwiSaver members more time to 
accumulate incentives. This tendency for the unequal incidence of KiwiSaver incentives to 
strengthen over time reflects the growing importance of the SSCWT exemption as a source of 
benefit, and the diminishing effect of the one-off, $1,000 kickstart payment over a longer 
time horizon. 
 
IV. The Impact of KiwiSaver Incentives on Inequality 
 
KiwiSaver incentives are unequally distributed, as Table 2 makes clear. So too, however, are 
many other rewards in both a market economy and from public transfers. Hence, what 
matters is how much KiwiSaver incentives contribute to inequality compared with other 
income sources. We therefore use a decomposition technique, developed by Lerman and 
Yitzhaki (1985), which shows the contribution of each income source to inequality in total 
                                                                                                                                                  
cohort-specific employment and survival rates and the current earnings of people of age a with the 
same characteristics, allowing for real income growth at an assumed annual rate of two percent 
and variation of the respondent’s idiosyncratic income from the cohort mean. The value of 
KiwiSaver contributions is then calculated, based on the assumption that individuals continue 
contributing at the same rate in the future as they reported in the survey, and that employer 
contribution rates stay the same if they are already four percent or above, and otherwise increase 
according to the KiwiSaver legislation, from one percent in 2008 to four percent in 2011. The 
values of the tax incentives in each year until age 65 are calculated once these member and 
employer contributions are known, assuming a continuation of the current rules. These predictions 
of the tax incentives in each year are then converted to a present value assuming a real discount 
rate of six percent. 
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incomes. In this decomposition, each source’s contribution to the Gini coefficient for total 
income is the product of its own inequality (G), its share of total income (S), and its 
correlation with the rank of total income (R).  
 
 The results of this decomposition for the first year of KiwiSaver are shown in Table 3. All 
three of the KiwiSaver incentives considered (the $1,000 kickstart, the $1,043 matching 
contribution and the SSCWT exemption) act to increase inequality (based on their positive 
values for I – the share of inequality due to each source). The most unequally distributed of 
these three incentives is the SSCWT exemption, as seen from its very high Gini coefficient 
(0.98). Moreover, the SSCWT exemption is also the most highly correlated with the rank of 
total income (R=0.84), showing that this incentive accrues mainly to the rich. In fact, the 
contribution to inequality from the SSCWT exemption is twice its contribution to total 
income, as seen from the (I/S) ratio of 2.0, which is easily the highest of any income source. 
The contrast with New Zealand Superannuation is striking. The correlation of NZS with the 
rank of total income is negative (R=-0.34), so NZS acts to reduce total inequality, by 
approximately five percent (I=-0.05). 
 
Share
 of total 
income
Gini 
coefficient by 
source
Correlation 
with rank of 
total income
Share of 
income 
inequality
Relative 
income 
inequality
(S)  (G) (R) (I) (I/S)
Income source
KiwiSaver Tax Incentivesa 0.0083 0.8693 0.4421 0.0078 0.9398
    $1000 kickstart 0.0037 0.8676 0.3087 0.0024 0.6486
    $1043/yr tax credit 0.0038 0.8696 0.4866 0.0039 1.0263
    SSCWT exemption 0.0007 0.9774 0.8419 0.0014 2.0000
New Zealand Super 0.0696 0.8367 -0.3440 -0.0486 -0.6983
Earnings 0.7173 0.5716 0.8749 0.8690 1.2115
Other income 0.2047 0.8047 0.4306 0.1718 0.8393
TOTAL 0.4128
Note:  All values weighted by sampling weights, which are the expansion factors needed to gross the sample up to 
population totals, for the resident New Zealand population age 18 and above.
Income sources with a negative R and I act to reduce overall income inequality.
a Includes the fee subsidy of $40 per year.
Table 3: Inequality By Income Source, Annual Income 2007/2008
 
 
Since the SSCWT exemption will over time become a more important source of benefit, 
while the kickstart benefit is a one-off, a longer-term perspective would be likely to find that 
the overall impact of KiwiSaver incentives on inequality is even greater than what is shown 
in Table 3.  This intuition is confirmed in Figure 1, which compares concentration curves for 
KiwiSaver incentives in the first year and over the lifetime, with the concentration curve for 
NZS. These concentration curves show the cumulative percentage of KiwiSaver incentives 
(or any transfer) accruing to the poorest x% of the population. The horizontal axis measures 
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percentiles of income distribution, from poorest to richest, and the vertical axis measures 
accumulated percentage of total transfers. If everyone, irrespective of income, received 
exactly the same value of KiwiSaver incentives, the concentration curve would be a 450 line 
from the bottom left-hand corner to the top right-hand corner, and this is the line of equality. 
Transfers and income sources with concentration curves above the line of equality (i.e, those 
with concave curves) reduce inequality, those below the line of equality increase inequality. 
If one concentration curve is below (more convex than) another, it indicates a more unequal 
distribution of this transfer or income source. 
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Cumulative share of population
Line of equality NZ Super
Year 1 KiwiSaver incentives Lifetime KiwiSaver incentives
 
Figure 1: Concentration Curves for KiwiSaver Tax Incentives and NZ Superannuation 
  
 The concentration curve for the lifetime value of KiwiSaver incentives lies mostly below 
the concentration curve for the incentives in the first year. For example, the poorest 50 
percent of the population (according to current incomes) receive just 13 percent of the 
lifetime value of KiwiSaver incentives (conditional on current membership levels) but over 
22 percent of the incentives in the first year. Hence the KiwiSaver incentives are more 
unequally distributed in the long-run, as also shown in Table 2, and are therefore likely to 
produce a larger impact on lifetime inequality than the impact in the first year shown in 
Table 3. The effect of NZS in dampening inequality is also apparent in Figure 1, with the 
concentration curve for NZS being almost everywhere above the line of equality. 
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 One potential concern with the results presented thus far is that they may provide a 
misleading guide to how KiwiSaver incentives will impact on inequality once more members 
have joined. At the time of the survey only about 15 percent of the relevant age-range 
population had joined, while government projections allow for either a ‘high’ take-up rate of 
65 percent after 10 years or a ‘fast’ take-up rate of 50 percent after five years. Perhaps as 
more people join the impact on inequality is reversed? 
 
 To help assess the likely impacts of KiwiSaver incentives on inequality in the future when 
there are higher membership rates we first estimate probit regression models of whether or 
not a survey respondent is already a member. These models provide predicted probabilities of 
membership, based on characteristics like age, income and so forth, so that we can then 
simulate who would be a member in future, by assigning the non-members with the highest 
predicted probabilities into the simulated membership group. Since auto enrollees and direct 
enrollees have quite distinct characteristics (younger and poorer for auto enrollees versus 
older and richer for direct enrollees) we estimate separate models for these two membership 
categories. The results of the two probit models are reported in Table 4, and these show the 
relevance of young age for auto enrollment, and high incomes, higher qualifications and older 
age for direct enrolment. 
 
 The predictions from the models in Table 4 are used to simulate a situation which may 
occur by about the year 2011, by which time 50 percent of the population may have been 
enrolled in KiwiSaver (assumed to be split between 20 percent auto enrolled and 30 percent 
direct enrolled, since the 3:1 ratio found in the survey will fall over time). Existing KiwiSaver 
and KiwiSaver compliant members are assumed to maintain their current status. We also 
assume that all of the direct enrollees will have joined prior to the year that is being simulated, 
since this group will want to enroll as quickly as possible to maximize the value of the tax 
incentives. One fifth of the auto enrollees are assumed to join in the year being simulated, 
since membership of this group should grow at a declining rate over time.12  
 
 The simulation also assumes that existing members and their employers maintain their 
current KiwiSaver contribution rates, except that where employer contribution rates are 
below four percent of gross pay these are raised in line with the schedule set out in the 
KiwiSaver legislation. The simulated new members are assumed to contribute four percent of 
their earnings, which is the same rate that their employer contributes. The other components 
of income (earnings, NZS and other income) are left at the same values used for the 
calculations reported in Table 3 so that the only factors changing are the expansion in 
KiwiSaver membership and the mandated rise in the rate of employer contributions. 
                                                
12  While the rate of job turnover may be approximately constant over time, turnover will yield fewer 
new auto enrolments in future since a rising fraction of people starting new jobs will already have 
enrolled in KiwiSaver. 
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Coefficienta P>|z|b Coefficienta P>|z|b
Age
Age 18-34 ref group
Age 35-44 -0.018 0.015 0.066 0.052
Age 45-54 -0.042 0.015 ** 0.150 0.063 ***
Age 55-64 -0.040 0.012 ** 0.307 0.081 ***
Gender
Female ref group
Male 0.003 0.017 -0.007 0.028
Ethnicity
Maori and Pacific Island -0.021 0.016 0.016 0.042
Other ethnic groups ref group
Education
Fifth form qualifications or below ref group
6th or 7th Form, trade cert or diploma -0.024 0.023 0.068 0.034 **
Bachelors degree or higher quals -0.016 0.019 0.144 0.058 ***
Income Group
Up to $30,000 ref group
$30,001-$70,000 0.015 0.020 0.073 0.040 **
$70,001 and above -0.009 0.018 0.084 0.050 *
Table 4: Probit Regression Models Used to Simulate Future Membership of KiwiSaver
Note: Number of observations = 481. The pseudo-R2 for the auto enrolment model is 0.10 and for the direct enrolment model 
is 0.11. The Wald tests for the goodness of fit of the entire model are 12.52 for the auto enrolment model and 38.19 for the 
direct enrolment model. These are statistically  significant at the 0.08 and 0.01 level with 9 degrees of freedom.
aThe coefficients are transformed into marginal effects, showing the effect of a one unit change in the explanatory variable on 
the probability of being an auto or direct enrolled KiwiSaver member.
b *** = significant at 0.01, ** = significant at 0.05, * = significant at 0.1.
Standard 
error
Standard 
error
Auto enrolment Direct enrolment
 
 
 The results of the inequality decomposition for the simulated situation in a year like 2011 
are shown in Table 5. All of the KiwiSaver incentives still increase inequality even with one-
half of the age eligible population enrolled. In total, the simulated KiwiSaver incentives 
contribute 1.5 percent to an annual income total that includes them as equivalent to an income 
stream, but they contribute 1.8 percent to the total inequality. In the simulation, the kickstart 
payment is a relatively minor part of the total incentive package, while the SSCWT 
exemption becomes almost one-third of the total (up from one-twelve in the first year). This 
tax exemption is, once again, proportionately, the largest contributor to inequality of any 
income source considered in Table 5, as seen from its (I/S) ratio of 1.6. The impact of 
KiwiSaver incentives in raising income inequality is therefore likely to be an enduring feature 
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of their design, rather than simply a transitory byproduct that disappears once membership 
becomes more universal. 
 
Share
 of total 
income
Gini 
coefficient by 
source
Correlation 
with rank of 
total income
Share of 
income 
inequality
Relative 
income 
inequality
(S)  (G) (R) (I) (I/S)
Income source
KiwiSaver Subsidiesa 0.0154 0.7010 0.6774 0.0178 1.1558
    $1000 kickstart 0.0009 0.9694 0.1932 0.0004 0.4444
    $1043/yr tax credit 0.0098 0.6610 0.6437 0.0101 1.0306
    SSCWT exemption 0.0044 0.7986 0.8228 0.0070 1.5909
New Zealand Super 0.0691 0.8367 -0.3603 -0.0503 -0.7279
Earnings 0.7121 0.5716 0.8820 0.8672 1.2178
Other income 0.2032 0.8047 0.4187 0.1654 0.8140
TOTAL 0.4140
Table 5: Predicted Inequality By Income Source When One Half of Age Eligible Population are in KiwiSaver
Note:  Calculations based on simulated membership estimated from the probit models in Table 4, assuming that 30% of 
the age eligible population are direct enrollees, 20% are auto enrollees, and 50% are non-members. Existing KiwiSaver 
and KiwiSaver compliant members (ca. December 2007) maintain their membership. The simulated members are assumed 
to contribute 4% of earnings and the employer contribution is also 4%. Existing members and their employers maintain 
their current contribution (employer contribution rates below 4% are raised to 4%). Direct enrollees are assumed to have 
joined KiwiSaver before the current year, while one-fifth of auto enrollees are assumed to have joined in the current year 
with the rest joining in earlier years.
For other notes, see Table 3.
 
 
 Another way to consider the results from the simulation of 50 percent KiwiSaver 
membership is in terms of the incidence of the tax incentives. Figure 2 compares the 
population shares of various income groups with their shares of the tax incentives received in 
the first year, with the lifetime value of the tax incentives for first year members, and with the 
shares of incentives once 50 percent of the population are members. Both the lifetime impact 
for first year members and the simulated incidence in the year when membership reaches 50 
percent are substantially more unequal than in the first year. For example, the richest group 
(those with incomes of $70,001 and above), receive 22 percent of tax incentives once 
membership reaches 50 percent (and employer contributions are raised to four percent), 
compared with only a 17 percent share of the incentives in the first year.  
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Figure 2: Incidence of KiwiSaver Tax Incentives in Several Time Periods and Simulations 
 
V. Conclusions 
Recent changes to New Zealand’s system of saving for retirement, with the introduction of 
KiwiSaver and its associated tax incentives, will increase future inequality in lifetime 
incomes and lead to diverging living standards for the elderly. Such inequalities might be 
considered an inherent feature of any saving scheme, since rewards partly depend on the 
amount of risk that is borne. However, it is unclear whether either proponents of the 
KiwiSaver scheme or the general public are aware of the likely impacts on inequality. This is 
especially because the most dis-equalizing component of KiwiSaver incentives is the SSCWT 
exemption, which was introduced in December 2006, with little fanfare and even less 
consultation (St John, 2006), outside of the main announcements in May 2005 for KiwiSaver 
and in May 2007 for the subsequent extensions of KiwiSaver incentives.  
 
 These increases in inequality might also be deemed as an acceptable cost, in order to 
obtain the benefit of higher household saving. However there are grounds for doubt about this 
as well, since both previous New Zealand experience and overseas evidence suggests that tax 
incentives for saving mainly encourage shifts from non-tax favoured saving into tax-favoured 
saving, with little change in overall saving but a large hidden cost to the Government in tax 
foregone. In a companion paper to the present study, we use the survey results to examine 
how much new household saving is being stimulated by KiwiSaver and how much is simply 
a reshuffling of money that would have been saved anyway. It appears that out of every 
dollar in KiwiSaver accounts only 9-19 cents is new saving (Gibson and Le, 2008). Whether 
this is sufficient to warrant the increases in inequality described here is a question which is 
relevant to all social policy analysts and practitioners interested in inequality and retirement 
living standards. 
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